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I ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the withholding grounds of the Official Information 
Act 1982 that are designed to provide certain protections for advice and opinions 
provided in the governmental context. The analysis of two specific provisions 
brings to light a number of issues that are of wider application to the OIA as a 
whole. 
While the construction of the provisions examined is highly flexible and may be 
compared favourably with equivalent legislation in other jurisdictions in terms of the 
level of access to governmental information they afford, it is suggested that these 
advantages also have a cost in terms of the practical difficulties of application. 
These difficulties are explored firstly in terms of analysis of the available reference 
material, primarily case notes and guidelines issued by the Ombudsman. Revised 
guidelines have recently been released by the Ombudsman, and these are analysed in 
terms of how much assistance they may provide to the holders of official 
information. 
The issues ansmg m respect of the prov1s10ns are also considered in terms of 
evidence obtained in interviews with officials who use the provisions in practice and 
also the Chief Ombudsman. 
Possible solutions are considered for the problems identified with the use of the 
provisions in practice, including legislative and administrative options. It is 
proposed that in the present context, an administrative solution is more suitable. In 
this regard it is suggested that a public sector specialist unit may be able to provide a 
range of administrative functions that will benefit compliance with these provisions, 
as well as with the OIA as a whole. 
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II INTRODUCTION 
When the Official Information Act 1982 ("the OIA" or "the Act") was passed, New 
Zealand began a major transition from being a nation typically obsessed with 
secrecy, to becoming regarded as one of the most transparent countries in the world. 1 
One of the significant factors leading to New Zealand's 'freedom of information' 
legislation being regarded as exceptionally open is its treatment of sensitive advice 
and opinions provided in the governmental context.2 Even the most enthusiastic 
proponents of 'maximal openness' in government generally concede that there needs 
to be some protection for certain functions of government in order to allow it to 
govern effectively and for decisions to be made out of the public gaze. 3 
This paper examines two specific withholding grounds contained in the OIA that are 
intended to provide protection for the sensitive processes of government; section 
9(2)(f)(iv) and section 9(2)(g)(i) ("the provisions"). In order to obtain an 
understanding of the provisions and how they are applied in practice, they are 
analysed in te1ms of their construction and the interpretations applied by the 
Ombudsmen, as evidenced by the Ombudsmen's Case Notes and the guidelines they 
have issued. Revised guidelines have very recently been issued by the Ombudsmen, 
and these may be considered both in te1ms of what they reveal about the evolution of 
approach to the provisions, and also the level of assistance they may provide to those 
seeking to interpret and apply them. 
1 J Belgrave, "The Official Information Act and the Policy Process" in Legal Research Foundation, 
Th e Official lnfonnation Act Seminar Papers: General Overview of Official Information and th e 
Official lnformatio.n Act ( 1997) at 29. 
1 See R Snell , "The Kiwi Paradox - A Comparison of Freedom of Information in Australia and New 
Zealand" Federal Law Review Yo! 28 No.3 2000, 575 - 616 at 592 - 602 . 
3 Luc Juillet & Gilles Paquet, Information Policy and Go vernance, (Report 1, Access to Information 
Review Task Force, Canada, June 200 I) at 11 -12 . 
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In order to obtain a better understanding of the use of the provisions, a number of 
officials who worked with them regularly were interviewed, providing a perspective 
on the practical difficulties that arise with their application. These problems are 
discussed in terms of compliance with the OIA, where compliance has been 
interpreted broadly as encompassing a range of 'administrative compliance' issues.
4 
The issues identified might be addressed using legislative or administrative methods, 
and both approaches are considered. There have been some proposals for 
amendment of the provisions, and these are assessed along with the possibility of 
having more prescriptive drafting, as is contained in the equivalent Australian 
legislation. However, there are a number of problems that arise, both legal and 
political, in pursuing a legislative solution. 
Accordingly, an administrative solution is likely to provide a more practical and 
effective solution to the issues arising in relation to the use of the provisions ( and, by 
extension, possibly to other issues arising with the withholding grounds contained in 
the OIA). Given the range of problems identified, any such solution will need to be 
of a comprehensive and wide ranging nature. Furthermore, in order to maximise the 
chances of success, any administrative changes will require the support of both 
officials and the Ombudsman. It is proposed that a dedicated public sector unit 
could provide the support and research roles that are required to both simplify the 
role of officials and to foster compliance with the OIA in this area. 
4 The phrase ' Administrative compliance ' is used here in its broadest sense; for example it may be 
suggested that in some cases release of information may be contrary to the public interest and to the 
objects of the Act, despite the fact the O!A itself does not contain any sanction for release of 
information (and in fact protects from civil or criminal proceedings the good faith release of 
information under it; s 48 OIA) . 
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III THEO/A 
A. The Introduction of freedom of information 
Prior to the introduction of the OIA, the general approach to official information, 
and the advice and opinions that made up part of that official information, was to 
cloak it in secrecy. This was codified in the Official Secrets Act 1951. This 
enactment continued a tradition of secrecy that New Zealand had inherited from 
Britain along with many other aspects of the 'Westminster style' democratic system 
of government. Traditionally under such systems, governments were considered to 
hold a discretionary right to decide what documents or information should be 
released. The common law had also supported this approach, holding that "The 
counsels of the Crown are secret."5 
A significant step in the path towards freedom of information in New Zealand 
occurred in 1978, when the Government established the 7 member Committee on 
Official Information, which became known as the 'Danks committee'.
6 The Danks 
committee had wide terms of reference to consider the Official Secrets Act 1951 and 
how greater freedom of official information could be attained. 
The Danks Committee produced two comprehensive reports in 1980,
7 the second of 
which contained a draft Official Infomiation Bill. This was immediately introduced 
into the House and referred to a special Parliamentary Select Committee, undergoing 
5 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth ( 1951) 83 CLR I, Dixon J. There have been 
significant inroads into this view however, to the point where it has been commented that "[i]n short, 
the Queen 's papers have become the people 's" Lange v Atkinson [ 1998] 3 NZLR 424 at 463 (CA) 
Richardson P, Henry, Keith and Blanchard JJ. 
6 After its chaim1an, Sir Alan Danks. 
7 Committee on Official lnfom1ation (hereafter Danks Committee), Towards Open Government 
(Volume I, General Report, Wellington, 1980), and Towards Open Government (Volume 2, 
Supplementary Report, 1980). 
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a number of changes at that stage. 8 The OIA became law in December 1982 and 
came into force on 1 July 1983. 
At its introduction, the OIA itself was subject to criticism for not going far enough in 
promoting freedom of information. Some of the reasons for withholding provided 
for in the Act seemed unnecessarily broad and ill-defined, prompting the then Prime 
Minister Robert Muldoon to refer to the Act as a "nine day wonder". 9 This view 
seems likely to have been related to the breadth of the provisions relating to the 
withholding of tendered advice and free and frank opinion. 10 
However, it seems typical that the provisions in a new freedom of information act 
that are intended to protect sensitive advice and opinion in government are often the 
centre of debate and controversy. This has recently been recognised in discussion on 
the equivalent provisions in the relatively recent UK freedom of information 
legislation. 11 The reasons for this seem to relate to the real difficulties arising in 
striking a balance between access and protection in this area. 
Overall, however, and with the benefit of hindsight, it would seem that the members 
of the Danks Committee would need to make few apologies for their efforts in 
producing the basis for the OIA. Nearly twenty years on, the OIA has become an 
essential and enduring part of the landscape of government in New Zealand, and is 
8 K Keith "The Official Information Act 1982" in R J Gregory (ed) The OJA: A Beginning 
(Government Bookshop, Wellington, 1984) 31, 33. 
9 See J Belgrave "The OJA and the Policy Process" in Legal Research Foundation, The OJA Seminar 
papers: General Overview of Official Information and th e OJA (February 1997) at 24. 
10 J Belgrave "The OIA and the Policy Process" in Legal Research Foundation, The OJA Seminar 
papers: General Overview of Official Information and the OJA (February 1997) at 24. 
11 Freedom of lnfo1mation Act 2000 (UK), s 28. In commenting on the draft legislation, the Select 
Committee on Public Administration observed that the area "has always been one of the especially 
difficult areas for Freedom of Information legislation"; Third Report of the Select Committee on 
Public Administration, Open Government or Freedom of Information (House of Commons, 28 July 
1999). 
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compared very favourably to overseas freedom of information statutes. 12 In 
particular, the design of the Act is widely considered to be particularly effective. 13 
B. The Schema of the OIA 
(i) Fundamental Principles 
There are three fundamental purposes of the OIA, as set out in section 4: 
1. To 'increase progressively the availability of official information to the people of 
New Zealand.' 
2. To provide for proper access by each person to official information relating to 
that person; 14 
3. To protect official information to the extent consistent with the public interest and 
the preservation of personal privacy. 15 
It may also be noted in the present context that all of the above purposes are to be 
pursued "consistently with the principle of the Executive Governments 
responsibility to Parliament." 16 
It can be seen from purpose (1) above that the Act incorporates an evolutionary 
aspect - more official information is to be made available through time. The making 
available of official information is also linked with the concepts of allowing the 
JJ Grant Liddell, "The Official Information Act l 982 and the Legislature: A Proposal" in Legal 
Research Foundation, The OJA Seminar papers: General Overview of Official Information and the 
OJA (February 1997) at 5. 
13 See generally R Snell , "The Kiwi Paradox - A Comparison of Freedom of Information in Australia 
and New Zealand" Federal Law Review Yo! 28 No.3 2000, 575 - 616. 
14 OTA s4(b). 
15 OIA s4(c). 
16 OlA s4. This does not provide an additional ground for withholding, however, it indicates that 
there is to be overall regard for the Executive processes of accountability. 
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public more effective participation in the making and administration of laws and 
policies, and also to promote the accountability of ministers and officials. 17 
If one puts to one side the references to personal information and privacy (such 
concerns having been to an extent subsequently displaced by the enactment of the 
Privacy Act 1993), the primary purposes of the OIA may be seen to be concerned 
with both increasing the availability of official information, but also protecting such 
information to the extent consistent with the public interest. 18 
A further fundamental concept in the Act is the 'principle of availability' contained 
in section 5. The presumption is that information is to be made available unless 
there are good reasons for withholding it. Taken together, sections 4 and 5 may be 
considered to be the 'heart' of the OIA. 19 Importantly, in the present context, where 
there are good reasons for withholding 'government process' information, then one 
of the purposes of the Act will be protection of that information (to the extent 
consistent with the public interest). 
(ii) The Withholding Grounds 
The OIA can be considered to be a code insofar as only the specified grounds 
contained within it can provide a basis for withholding any official information.20 
There are three broad categories of reasons for withholding official information in 
the Act, which may be characterised as 'conclusive', 'conditional' and 
'administrative' grounds for withholding respectively. 
17 OlA s4(a)(i) & (ii). 
18 However, the latter purpose seems to be very much the ' poor relation ' in the eyes of successive 
Ombudsmen if the frequency of reference in the Ombudsmen 's Case Notes is to provide a guide. 
19 I Eagles, M. Taggart, and G Liddell , Freedom of Information in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland 1992), 4. 
!O O!A s 18. 
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The 'conclusive' (or 'special') reasons for withholding information are contained in 
sections 6 and 7 of the Act. These are reasons relating to the maintenance of 
national security, maintenance of the law, and so on. Good reason exists if the 
making available of the information is simply 'likely' to prejudice or damage the 
d · 21 protecte mterests. 
The 'conditional' reasons for withholding that we are primarily concerned with here 
are described as "other" grounds for withholding and are contained in section 9(2) of 
the Act. 22 In order to rely on one of these grounds the withholding must be 
"necessary" to protect one of the identified interests.23 These reasons for withholding 
are subject to an overarching 'public interest' test, whereby the Ombudsmen may 
determine that the public interest dictates that the information should be released, 
even where it is agreed that one of the section 9 reasons for withholding applies.24 
The 'administrative' withholding prov1s1ons are contained in section 18 of the 
OIA.25 These are not subject to a 'public interest' test. A relevant example of these 
allows a request for information to be refused where that information "is or soon will 
be publicly available".26 
An impo11ant point to be made in relation to the withholding grounds contained in 
the Act is that none of them constitute a 'c lass' of documents that are to be withheld. 
This type of approach was rejected by the Danks committee.27 The important 
21 For example under OIA s 6(e), a conclusive reason for withholding information exists if the 
release of the requested information is likely ' to damage seriously the economy of New Zealand by 
disclosing prematurely decisions to change or continue Government economic or financial policies ' .. 
22 OlA section 9(2)(f)(iv) and section 9(2)(g)(i). 
23 The test to be applied is ' reasonable ' necessity as opposed to 'strict ' necessity ; TVNZ v 
Ombudsman [1992] 1 ZLR 106 at 117-118. 
24 OJA section 9( I) . Including such a 'a public interest override' in thi s area is unusual in 
comparison with overseas freedom of information legislation . 
25 OIAs 18(c) -(h) . 
26 OIA s l 8(d). The interface between this subsection and the provisions under examination is 
discussed below. 
27 Danks Committee, Towards Open Government (Volume I, General Report, Wellington, 1980), 
para 65. 
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considerations m assessing whether to withhold have been set out by the 
Ombudsman: 
"whether certain information should be withheld under the Act is determined not 
simply by virtue of the nature of the information but in terms of whether its 
disclosure would prejudice an interest which the Act recognises as requiring 
protection." 28 
The Court of Appeal has noted that, even if a reason to withhold is made out, an 
organisation may still elect to release.29 However, it may be seen from the foregoing 
discussion of the purposes of the Act that a release of information in such a 
circumstance could be argued to be contrary to the objects of the Act, particularly 
where such a release was contrary to the public interest. 
(iii) Scope of O(flcial Information 
The Act covers an enormous amount of information. Ministers and more than 200 
government departments and other organisations are subject to the OIA. 30 The vast 
majority of governmental organisations are covered by the Act, including most State 
Owned Enterprises ("SOE's"). 31 
The OIA is information based rather than document based. Commentators tend to 
agree that this feature of the OIA seems to make it a more effective freedom of 
information statute than the many overseas acts that emphasise the disclosure of 
documents over information.32 For example, the Act allows for reasons for a 
JB 10th Compendium of Case ates of the Ombudsmen (Vol 2), 5. (Hereinafter Compendiums of 
Case Notes will be referred to as 'CCNO') 
J
9 Commissioner of Police v Ombudsman [ 1988] I NZLR 385 at 391 per Cooke P. 
30 Listed in the first schedule to the Ombudsmen Act 1975 and in the first schedule to the OJA. 
31 Although the Act is of limited application to some SOE's; see for e.g. Rural Banking Finance 
Corporation of NZ Act 1989 s 18. 
3
J See G Liddell , "The Official Information Act 1982 and the Legislature: A Proposal" in Legal 
Research Foundation, The Official Information Act Seminar Papers: General Overview of Official 
Information and the Official Information Act ( 1997) at 6. 
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decision to be sought, even where those reasons do not already in exist in written or 
other form. 33 The Ombudsmen have made it clear that in their view information 
contained only in the heads of officials is official information that is subject to, and 
may be recovered under, the Act,34 despite some earlier judicial disagreement on this 
point.35 This makes for a potentially very powerful information gathering tool 
indeed. 
(iv) Review Process 
Where an agency withholds infom1ation on one or more of the grounds provided in 
the OIA, this is a decision that is subject to investigation and review by the 
Ombudsman. 36 The Ombudsman has wide powers to require disclosure of 
information in the course of an investigation. 37 
The Ombudsman 's investigations are conducted in "an impartial and non-adversarial 
way". 38 The Ombudsman seeks to resolve the complaint during the course of the 
investigation, and forms a 'provisional view' which is referred to the parties for 
comment. If the provisional view is that the information at issue should be released, 
the agency involved will generally agree to release the information at that point. 39 
In the event that the agency does not agree to release the information, the 
Ombudsman may proceed to form a final view on the merits of the complaint. In the 
event that the concluded view is that the complaint is to be upheld, the Ombudsman 
33 OIA s 23. 
34 New Zealand Ombudsman "Application of Official Information legislation to non-documentary 
information" ( 1998) 4(3) Ombudsman Quarterly Review at I. See also Case o. W4 I 571, CC O 12. 
35 RvHarvey( l991] I ZLR242at246perThomasJ. 
36 OlA s 28(1)(a). The decision to give the Ombudsmen the principle role in adjudicating upon 
infom1ation access disputes was something of a departure from overseas precedents ; Philip A. 
Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2"d ed, 200 I) 158. 
37 OJA s 29A and Ombudsman Act 1975 s 19. In practice these powers are seldom formally utilised, 
as agencies generally provide all information requested by the Ombudsman at the outset of an 
investigation. 
38 Ombudsmen's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part D chapter I . 
39 Ombudsmen's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part D chapter 4, 5. 
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can then proceed to make recommendation(s) that the information at issue be 
released pursuant to the request. 40 Such a recommendation imposes a public duty to 
observe that recommendation 21 days after it is made, unless the Governor-General, 
by Order in Council, otherwise directs.41 This is sometimes referred to as the 
'cabinet veto' , which has, to date, not been used. Although agencies can and do 
sometimes ignore recommendations that become binding, this is generally regarded 
as unacceptable practice.42 Such agencies face having the duty to disclose enforced 
by a court of law.43 
IV WITHHOLDING PROVISIONS PROTECTING EFFECTIVE 
GOVERNMENT 
A. What Requires Protection? 
The principal benefits of freedom of information relate to the power that it grants to 
the people to scrutinise public decision making. Such scrutiny may be anticipated to 
result in better, more robust decision making processes and higher levels of 
accountability. 44 
40 OTA s 30( I). In limited circumstances the power of the Ombudsman to make a recommendation 
may be subject to a ' veto', for example where the Prime Minister certifies that the release of the 
information would be likel y to prejudice the security or defence of ew Zealand. 
41 OJA s 32. 
42 The Law Commission has noted that such inaction would only be tolerable if the agency 
immediately commenced judicial review proceedings in respect of the recommendation; New 
Zealand Law Commission Review of the Official Information Act 1982 (NZLC40, Wellington, 1997) 
para 364. 
n The Law Commission has suggested in such cases the Solicitor General should act to enforce the 
public duty by seeking judicial review on his or her own initiative; New Zealand Law Commission 
Review of the Official information Act 1982 (NZLC40, Wellington, 1997) para 382. 
N Philip A. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (2"d ed, 200 I) 149. 
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However, even the most dedicated proponents of freedom of information generally 
acknowledge the importance of some level of protection of government processes. 
Freedom of information needs to ensure that excessive transparency does not 
' 'unreasonably hamper the ability of the state to operate effectively in the public 
interest." 4 5 
This was also an important consideration for the Danks Committee, who noted: 
"To run the country effectively the government of the day needs nevertheless to be 
able to take advice and to deliberate on it, in private, and without fear of premature 
disclosure. If the attempt to open process of government inhibits the offering of 
blunt advice or effective consultation and arguments, the net result will be that the 
quality of decisions will suffer, as will the quality of the record. The processes of 
government could become less open and, perhaps, more arbitrary." 46 
The difficult task that confronted the Danks committee was to prepare draft 
provisions that sufficiently protected those advisory and decision making processes 
of government that required shielding from public scrutiny, without going so far as 
to provide a means for ministers and officials to conceal embarrassing or 
inconvenient information (which could in tum defeat the purposes of the Act). In 
the event, it was decided to draft the withholding grounds in this area in very broad, 
open-textured te1ms. 47 
In the event, the resulting provisions, section 9(2)(f) and section 9(2)(g), have come 
to hold an important place in the Act, as befitting provisions " intended by the Danks 
45 Luc Juillet & Gilles Paquet, Information Policy and Governance, (Report I , Access to Information 
Review Task Force, Canada, June 200 I), 12. 
46 Danks Committee, Towards Open Government (Volume I , General Repot1, Wellington , 1980), 
para 47 . 
47 In the words of the Danks Committee, " We opted for a flexible process ." Danks Committee, 
To wards Open Government (Volume I , General Report , Wellington , 1980), para 65. As will be seen , 
this is an unusual approach in dealing with this type of sensitive information . 
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Committee to be the centrepiece of their withholding regime."48 As will be seen, 
however, the construction of the provisions (and the interpretations adopted of them 
by successive Ombudsmen) mean that they are not free of problems in actual 
application. 
B. The Provisions 
Sections 9(2)(f)(iv) and 9(2)(g)(i) allow information to be withheld where necessary 
to: 
"(f) Maintain the constitutional conventions for the time being which 
protect-
(iv) The confidentiality of advice tendered by Ministers of the 
Crown and officials; or 
(g) Maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through -
(i) The free and frank expression of opinions by or between or to 
Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or 
officers and employees of any Department or organisation in 
the course of their duty; 
These provisions are subject to section 9(1): 
(1) Where this section applies, good reason for withholding official 
information exists, for the purpose of section 5 of this Act, unless, in 
the circumstances of the particular case, the withholding of that 
information is outweighed by other considerations which render it 
desirable, in the public interest, to make that information available. 
48 l Eagles, M. Taggari, and G Liddell, Freedom of Information in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland 1992), 334. 
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These prov1s10ns are clearly extremely important in the overall context of the 
internal workings of government. The Ombudsmen have noted that in terms of 
sections 9(2)(f) and 9(2)(g) of the OIA they are the 'two particular withholding 
provisions which are relied on most frequently when considering requests for 
information of that nature'. 49 
However it should be noted that the Act contains other provisions designed to afford 
some protection in this area; in particular sections 9(2)(f)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the OIA 
provide certain protections for the confidentiality of communications by or with the 
sovereign; collective and individual ministerial responsibility and the political 
neutrality of officials, respectively. For our present purposes, these sections provide 
an important context for distinguishing the provisions. 
C. Comparing the Provisions - What interest is to be maintained? 
(i) "Maintaining Conventions" 
Section 9(2)(f)(iv), (in common with the other section 9(2)(f) subsections), is 
notable for its appeal to constitutional conventions. In order to invoke the reason to 
withhold, the withholding must be "necessary" to "maintain the constitutional 
conventions" protecting the "confidentiality of advice tendered by ministers and 
officials". so 
Accordingly, where an agency has relied on section 9(2)(f)(iv) to withhold 
information, the Ombudsman would seem entitled to require that agency to specify 
what convention maintaining the confidentiality of official advice is being 
maintained by the withholding. This has in fact been the approach taken by the 
49 CCNO 12, (Introduction, 2000), 3 
50 OIA section 9(2)(f)(iv) 
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Ombudsman. 51 Logically, if an agency is contending that it is necessary to withhold 
the information in order to maintain a convention, the agency should be expected to 
know what that convention is. 
(ii) Identifying Conventions 
However, this is far from being a straightforward task. Conventions have been 
described as 'the constitutional morality of the day'. 52 They are by their nature 
unwritten and subject to change through time. 53 It is not impossible to formulate 
conventions accurately, even for legal purposes. 54 However, as Joseph has noted 
"[t]he tests for identifying conventions are neither universally agreed nor, when 
agreed, easily applied. Some conventions are clear, and some not so clear."55 
One approach to identifying conventions that achieved some acceptance is the 
threefold test devised by Sir Ivor Jennings; (I) Are there any precedents? (2) Did the 
actors in the precedents believe they were bound by a rule? (3) Is there a reason for 
the rule referable to the needs of constitutional government? 56 Accordingly, 
establishing a convention may be seen as involving an inquiry into past practice in 
accordance with a rule, confirming that the parties concerned believed they were 
acting in accordance with a rule, and consideration of whether the rule serves some 
. . 1 57 constltutlona purpose. 
Even applying this approach however, it may be expected that some conventions 
will be more elusive or resistant to formulation than others. The conventions at 
issue in section 9(2)(f)(iv) seem to fall squarely into the 'elusive' category. 
51 See for example the ' Reserve Bank Letters' case discussed below; CC 05 Case 42 (GR Laking). 
51 A.Y. Dicey, introduction to th e law of the Constitution ( I O'h ed 1960) 422 . 
53 Hence the reference in section 9(2)(f)(iv) to the conventions ' for the time being which protect '. 
54 See I Eagles, M. Taggart, and G Liddell, Freedom of information in New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland l 992), 337-338 for discussion on this point. 
55 Philip A. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (211d ed, 2001) 275 . 
56 Sir lvor Jennings, Th e Law and the Constitution (5th ed, University of London Press, 1959) 
Chapter 3. 
57 Philip A. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative law in New Zealand (2"d ed, 2001), 276. 
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(iii) Attempts at Formulation 
A typical early effort at formulating the convention at issue occurred in the 
"Reserve Bank Letters" case. 58 This case involved a request to the Reserve Bank 
for information on an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the 
Reserve Bank on Government monetary policies. When required by the 
Ombudsman to define the convention that was required to be protected, the Reserve 
Bank contended that the convention was simply that Ministerial advisers did not 
make public the advice tendered to ministers. It was further argued that a 
convention existed that advice to a minister should remain confidential unless the 
minister chose to release it.59 
The Ombudsman rejected this formulation of the conventions at issue, noting that 
the Bank did not provide any evidence in support of them. The Ombudsman further 
noted that the suggestion that confidentiality was to be determined by the minister 
conflicted with the initial proposition that such advice was to be kept confidential.60 
The point was also made by the Ombudsman that "[t]he nature of a constitutional 
convention is such that it can be departed from without necessarily impairing its 
effectiveness" and that accordingly simply arguing that a release of information 
would be contrary to a convention; "[t]he test is whether disclosure of the 
information would go to the heart of that particular convention."61 
The Ombudsman did go on to acknowledge that "there is a convention which 
protects the confidentiality of advice tendered to ministers" but did not provide any 
analysis of what that convention was.62 In the event, some of the information at 
issue was found to have been properly withheld under section 9(2)(f)(iv), despite the 
58 CCN05 Case 42 (G R Laking). 
59 CCN05 Case 42 (G R Laking) at 58 . 
6° Case 42, above, 58. 
6 1 Case 42, above, 59. 
62 Case 42, above, 60-61 . 
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withholder apparently having no accurate conception of what convention(s) they 
were protecting. 
This approach continued to be applied in subsequent cases dealing with section 
9(2)(f)(iv), and the Ombudsmen subsequently commented on the (somewhat 
remarkable) fact that no agency had ever successfully identified a convention to be 
maintained in terms of section 9(2)(f)(iv).63 The overall approach seems to have 
been accurately summed up by a UK observer who noted: 
"The Ombudsman wisely declines to offer any definition, instead he asks 
departments what they understand to be the constitutional conventions and then 
shoots holes in their definitions." 64 
The conundrum therefore presented by section 9(2)(f)(iv) is that the schema of the 
section requires the accurate formulation of a 'convention to be maintained', in 
circumstances where the Ombudsman is inclined to reject any such formulation as 
an attempt to identify a 'class' of information to be protected. It is not clear from 
consideration of the case notes as to how far agencies may have gone in 
endeavouring to formally establish a convention, by adducing evidence of precedent 
and belief on the part of actors that they were bound.65 It would seem that regardless 
of any such efforts that might be made, the Ombudsmen would decline to confirm 
63 CCN09 I 123/ 1 196 (N Tollemache). 
64 R Hazell, Report to the Cabinet Office (M.P.O) on th e Operation of th e Official information Act in 
New Zealand (March 1987) para 11.14 (As quoted in I Eagles, M. Taggart, and G Liddell, Freedom 
of Information in New Zealand (Oxford University Press , Auckland 1992), 336). 
65 Eagles, Taggart & Liddell observe that " [ d]epartments and organisations have been reluctant to 
adduce particular evidence to support their general contentions about harm" ; I Eagles, M. Taggart, 
and G Liddell , Freedom of Information in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland 1992), 
336. However, the latest Annual Report discusses an investigation into the treatment of advice given 
by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet where extensive evidence was provided (including 
evidence from former Prime Minister's; Report of th e Ombudsmen for the Year ended 30 June 2002 
(AJHR, A.3, 2002), 29-33 . 
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the convention formulated, perhaps for concern that agencies would then take a 
'class' approach and withhold all information subject to the convention.66 
In the original practice guidelines issued by the Ombudsmen relating to the 
provisions little assistance can be found relating to this difficulty; the Ombudsmen 
simply acknowledged that defining the applicable convention was 'one of the most 
difficult areas ' that a withholder looking to rely on the provision is required to 
address. 67 As will be seen in subsequent consideration of the recently revised 
Guidelines, this area has continued to develop, although difficulties remain. 
(iv) "Maintaining the effective conduct of public affairs " 
In contrast to the requirement in section 9(2)(f)(iv) to establish that the withholding 
of the information is necessary to maintain an (undefined) convention, section 
9(2)(g)(i) allows information to be withheld where this is necessary to ' maintain the 
effective conduct of public affairs' (through the free and frank expression of 
opinions by or between or to Ministers, officials and others) . 68 
Accordingly, there is comparatively little difficulty with identifying the interest that 
section 9(2)(g)(i) is designed to protect, compared with section 9(2)(f)(iv). From a 
withholder's point of view, section 9(2)(g)(i) could be seen as offering an advantage 
over section 9(2)(f)(iv), in that there is no need to identify a convention (and face 
rejection of the convention, however formulated, by the Ombudsman). The concept 
of the 'effective conduct of public affairs ' is clearly a broad one, which does not 
carry with it the burden of establishing a course of conduct. Individual or unique 
instances might occur whereby withholding might be justified. 
66 More recentl y the Ombudsmen have come close to defining a convention as is discussed below. 
67 Ombudsmen ' s Practice Guidelines - No 2 "Current Approach of Ombudsman to Section 
9(2)(f)(iv) & Section 9(2)(g)(i) of the Official Information Act 1982" ( 1993) para 2.5 (now revised). 
68 OTA section 9(2)(g)(i). 
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Having said this, there may often be differences in perspective between agencies and 
the Ombudsmen as to when information may properly be withheld in order to 
protect the conduct of public affairs. The wide construction of the provision may 
often mean that it will be considered as a basis for withholding when an agency 
receives a request for ' embarrassing' information. Such information could be 
embarrassing to the agency (perhaps disclosing incompetence or prejudice), or 
involve revelations embarrassing to the government. In such a case an agency might 
consider that the release of such material would interfere with the proper conduct of 
public affairs (perhaps by diverting resources to deal with resulting publicity, 
complaints or proceedings). 
The Ombudsmen have made it clear that this type of approach is incorrect.69 It is not 
the case that the provision acts to protect particular ' embarrassing' opinions. On the 
contrary, given that the Act is designed to promote greater transparency and 
accountability, release of this type of material is consistent with these goals and with 
the ' proper conduct of public affairs ' . 70 
However, so long as withholders maintain a broad and objective view of what 
constitutes the 'effective conduct of public affairs ', this test would seem to be less 
problematic than the reference to ' conventions' in 9(2)(f)(iv). 
D. The Scope of the Provisions - what information is protected 
(i) Advice and Opinions provided by or to Whom ? 
Section 9(2)(f)(iv) applies to advice ' tendered by Ministers of the Crown and 
officials '. The further one departs from core government departments the more 
69 This has been emphasised in the revised practi ce guidelines; Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines 
(September 2002) Part E, 7. 
70 This was also clearl y the vi ew of the Danks Committee; Danks Committee, Towards Open 
Government (Volume I, General Report , Wellington , 1980), para 47. 
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problematic the question of who is an 'official' becomes.71 For present purposes, it 
is important to note that private sector advisors are not 'officials'.72 The subsection 
accordingly would not on the face of it apply to the substantial amount of advice 
provided to ministers from private agencies or individuals in their personal capacity. 
However, the Ombudsmen have suggested that private sector advice may be brought 
within section 9(2)(f)(iv) if it is 'adopted' by a minister. 73 This approach has been 
criticised as wrong by Eagles, Taggart & Liddell.74 However, relatively recent 
comments by Judge Anand Satyanand again seem to admit the possibility of 
adoption or incorporation of private sector advice so as to bring it within the ambit 
of the provision. 75 The precise mechanisms by which this might occur remain 
unclear. 
The construction of section 9(2)(g)(i) poses fewer difficulties in this regard, as the 
provision can apply to "The free and frank expression of opinions by or between or 
to Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or officers .. of any 
Department .. in the course of their duty." Free and frank opinions expressed by 
private sector advisors are accordingly captured by the provision, so long as they are 
made to Ministers or, (what appears to be in effect), 'officials'. This has been noted 
as conferring a useful degree of flexibility to the provision. 76 
71 Although it may be noted that issues can arise in relation to employees of SOE's - see discussion 
I Eagles, M. Taggart, and G Liddell, Freedom of information in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland 1992), 362-363. 
7
! I Eagles, M. Taggart, and G Liddell, Freedom of Information in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland 1992), 362. 
73 This possibility appears to have first been raised by the Ombudsman in CCN09, Case 110 I, 161 
(J. F. Robertson) , drawing on Australian authority. 
74 I Eagles, M. Taggart, and G Liddell, Freedom of information in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland 1992), 366. 
75 CCN012 Case W41576 (A Satyanand). 
76 See J Belgrave, "The Official Information Act and the Policy Process" in Legal Research 
Foundation, Th e Official Information Act Seminar Papers: General Overview of Official Information 
and the Official Information Act ( 1997) at 27. 
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(ii) Distingu,ishing between 'Tendered Advice ' and 'Free and Frank Opinions' 
Important questions arise in relation to the distinction between 'tendered advice' as 
protected by s9(2)(f)(iv) and 'free and frank opinions' as protected by section 
9(2)(g)(i). In particular, is it the case that an item of information may be both 
'tendered advice' and 'free and frank opinion' so that either or both provisions may 
be relied upon by a withholder? 77 
The view that both provisions might apply to the same information seems consistent 
with the very narrow definition offered by the Ombudsmen for 'tendered advice' in 
some early case notes; "to advise in this context means to offer opinions as to 
action".78 On this formulation, advice might be considered to be a specialised subset 
of opinion. 
The original Guidelines issued in respect of the provisions also acknowledged an 
'overlap' in the two concepts, noting that opinions frequently become the basis upon 
which advice is given. 79 The suggestion accordingly seemed to be that opinions 
occur first, with 'advice' being a later, more evolved and 'worked up' species of 
opm10n. 80 
This approach seems consistent with the requirement m section 9(2)(f)(iv) that 
advice be 'tendered'. As Eagles, Taggart and Liddell have commented, '[t]endered' 
suggests a certain diffidence in the giver as to the response of the recipient.' 81 The 
phrase imparts a notion of formality that would be absent in, for example, everyday 
communications between employees within a Department. 
77 This is certainly often how they are employed in practice, as is discussed further below. 
78 For example in CCNOS Case 42 (G R Laking) at 60. 
79 Ombudsmen's Practice Guidelines - No 2 "Current Approach of Ombudsman to Section 
9(2)(f)(iv) & Section 9(2)(g)(i) of the Official Information Act 1982" (1993) para 3.5 (now revised). 
80 Ombudsmen's Practice Guidelines - No 2, above, para 3.6. 
8 1 I Eagles, M Taggart and G Liddell , Freedom of lnfor111ation in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1992) at 361. 
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There is also no requirement that an opinion falling within section 9(2)(g)(i) be 
tendered. However, such an opinion is required to be ' free and frank ' . The reference 
to 'free and frank expression of opinion' can be seen as a restatement of the 
'candour' argument that underpinned claims of Crown privilege or public interest 
immunity. 82 Just as the courts have taken an increasingly restrictive approach to 
public interest immunity, 83 the Ombudsmen have also limited the scope of 
application of section 9(2)(g)(i). 84 
The Ombudsmen commonly observed in earlier Case Notes that section 9(2)(g)(i) 
protects only 'those especially frank opinions which only the assurance of complete 
confidentiality induces'. 85 In the 'Apple and Pear Marketing Board' case,86 the 
Ombudsman was very critical of the argument by the Minister of Agriculture that in 
general, 'free and frank' expressions of opinions by both ministers and officials 
should be withheld in order to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs. It 
was noted that such free and frank expression of opinion is part of the everyday 
operation of Government, and that the prospect of disclosure should not affect that. 87 
The Ombudsman went on to state that in his view the section only applied " .. where 
the comments were free and frank plus something extra deriving from the nature of 
the subject matter or the context in which the opinions were expressed." 88 
The use of the words "free and frank plus something extra" seem to add an 
uninformative gloss to the plain wording of section 9(2)(g)(i). This point was 
subsequently raised with the Ombudsman who confirmed that such an approach 
(seeking blanket protection for 'free and frank ' opinions) would amount to a "class" 
81 See I Eagles, M Taggart and G Liddell, Freedom of Information in New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1992) at 370. 
83 For example in Brightwell v Accident Compensation Corporation ( 1985) I NZLR 132. 
84 The Ombudsmen have referred to the more restrictive approach taken by the courts in this regard; 
for e.g. CCN09 Case I 076 (J Robertson). 
85 See for example CCN06 Case 23 75, 80 (GR Laking). 
86 CCN09 Case 1076, 147 (J Robertson). 
87 CCN09 Case 1076 (above) at 148. 
88 CCN09 Case 1076 (above) at 148. 
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approach to withholding which is contrary to the scheme of the Act, and would 
preclude the public interest balancing tests woven into the withholding regime. 89 
However, the Ombudsmen did acknowledge that the phrase "free and frank and 
something extra" could "convey the wrong impression", (although little corrective 
guidance was offered). 90 
Accordingly, it would seem that the Ombudsman accepts there may be a degree of 
overlap between 'tendered advice' and ' free and frank' opinion, although the degree 
of this is difficult to discern from the Case Notes. Certainly, it is considered that 
'free and frank ' opinions generally come before 'tendered advice' in the continuum, 
although what actually is ' free and frank' in this context is somewhat opaque. It is 
notable in this regard that the original Guidelines to an extent de-emphasised the 
importance of the distinction between the concepts of 'advice' and 'opinion'. The 
Ombudsmen noted therein that the test determining which provision properly applies 
to the information at issue may not necessarily tum on whether the information is 
"advice" or "opinion", but on consideration of what interest would be prejudiced by 
disclosure. 91 In other words, would release impact upon a pre-existing convention, 
or would it impair the maintenance of effective conduct of public affairs? 92 
(iii) Factual Material 
A further question may be raised as to what extent either of the prov1s10ns 
encompass factual material. In early statements the Ombudsmen it was considered 
that to tender advice in the context of section 9(2)(f)(iv) meant "to offer opinions as 
89 Ombudsmen 's Annual Report lo 31 March 1990 (AJHR, A3, 1990) 22-23. 
90 It may not be entirely coincidental that the Ombudsmen subsequently issued the original " Practice 
Guidelines" on the issue of the application of the provisions, although these too provided little in the 
way of detail on this point. 
91 Ombudsmen's Practice Guidelines No 2 (above) para 3.6. Note that this seems to be something of 
a departure from the earlier emphasis on distinguishing advice and opinion, for example in CCN05 
Case 42 (G R Laking). 
91 Although given the difficulty of determining the conventions to be protected this is perhaps an 
unhelpful analysis from a withholder's perspective. 
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to action". 93 The corollary of this was that factual material was not seen by the 
Ombudsmen as constituting advice. 94 The argument flowed from this that '"where 
facts can be segregated from advice they must be disclosed." 95 
However the original Guidelines departed from this view m commenting that 
'advice', in addition to meaning "opinion given or offered as to action", could also 
mean "information given", noting in addition that such information could be purely 
factual information.96 This constituted an interesting expansion of the scope of 
'tendered advice', and the interpretation would seem to be an arguable one in terms 
of the wording of the provision. 
The original Guidelines were silent as to whether 'free and frank opinions' could 
also be comprised of factual material only. Given that an 'overlap' between the 
provisions was acknowledged, this could be considered a possibility. However, in 
the overall context of section 9(2)(g)(i), the proposition that an 'especially' free and 
frank opinion could be given that comprised purely factual information would seem 
exceedingly unlikely. 
IV REFERENCES FOR APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS 
A. The Ombudsmen's Case Notes 
In trying to come to understand and apply the prov1s10ns m practice, the 
Ombudsman's case notes provide an imp011ant source of information.97 Given the 
93 CCN05 Case 42 (G R Laking) at 60. 
94 CCN09 Case 1123/1196, 157, at 159 (N. Tollemache). 
95 I Eagles, M Taggart and G Liddell, Freedom of Information in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1992) at 361. 
96 Ombudsmen's Practice Guidelines No 2 (above) para 3.6 . 
97 Since 5th Compendium was published in 1984, the Case Note Compendiums have included case 
notes on selected significant decisions made in relation to the Official Information Act. 
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rarity of review of the Ombudsman's decisions, the case notes can be considered to 
"represent the bulk of New Zealand jurisprudence on open government".98 
However, it is also true that the case notes have some real limitations as a reference 
for those trying to gain a full understanding of the Ombudsman's approach. This in 
tum may contribute to the issues officials face in applying the provisions. 
The case notes represent administrative decisions which, as the Ombudsmen have 
been at pains to point out, do not amount to binding precedents. 99 Accordingly, 
conclusions arrived at by the Ombudsman in an early case note may not be 
duplicated in a current review, even if the information at issue is materially the 
same. This is understandable, particularly in the case of section 9(2)(f)(iv) where 
the scope of the provisions are recognised to be liable to change through time, 100 
however it does mean that only cautious reliance may be placed upon the case notes. 
It is also often difficult to divine an accurate impression of the specific information 
at issue in the case note. While in general terms the nature of the information is 
made clear, it is hard to determine what the Ombudsman means when he says for 
example "I considered that one especially frank expression of opinion in one report 
was covered by section 9(2)(g)(i)". 10 1 It is impossible to probe what characteristics 
set this expression of opinion apart without having the opportunity to read and 
compare it to those opinions not considered to be covered by the provision. 102 
It is significant in this context that the case notes are only summanes of the 
Ombudsman's decision. Investigations conducted by the Ombudsman may have a 
complex history of evidence and submissions being obtained from various parties, 
98 I Eagles, M Taggart and G Liddell , Freedom of Information in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1992) at 18 . 
99 See CCN06 (Introduction) 5-6 (G.R. Laking) 
'
00 OJA section 9(2)(f)(iv) 
101 CCN06 Case 23, 75 (G R Laking). 
'
02 It is also relevant that an Ombudsmen ' s investigation is subject to secrecy; Ombudsmen Act 1975 
s 21. 
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and accordingly the summarised case note may not capture all of the subtleties of the 
investigation. 
The case notes are selected by the Ombudsman for their significance or instructive 
value. They will not necessarily reflect actual trends in the use of the provisions or 
the decisions of the Ombudsman in any meaningful statistical sense. As an example 
of this, a numerical analysis of the case notes might lead a researcher to conclude 
that section 9(2)(g)(i) was more frequently relied upon than section 9(2)(f)(iv) - the 
latter was cited as a sole ground for withholding approximately one quarter as often 
as section 9(2)(g)(i) was relied upon alone. Section 9(2)(f)(iv) was also twice as 
likely to be raised as a ground for withholding in conjunction with section 9(2)(g)(i) 
than to be relied upon by itself. 103 
However, while this conclusion would seem valid on the basis of representation in 
the case notes, it is quite likely to be wrong in fact. Given the small percentage of 
actual investigations that eventually appear in the case notes, it is quite possible that 
a larger number of matters involving section 9(2)(f)(iv) are dealt with, but not 
deemed of sufficient interest to be noted. This was admitted as a distinct possibility 
by the Chief Ombudsman, Sir Brian Elwood, during the course of an interview with 
the author. 104 
(i) Case Notes Summary 
It is perhaps ironic that the case notes can be opaque for lack of relevant 
information. It may also be difficult to determine if the approach taken in the case 
note will accurately reflect the Ombudsman ' s current thinking. 105 These issues 
clearly have implications for withholders trying to understand the provisions. 
'
03 Based on analysis of case notes relating to the provisions from 1984 to 2000. 
'
0
~ lnterview with Sir Brian Elwood, Chief Ombudsman, (the author, Wellington, 6 September 
2002) 
105 Particularly in the present context where there has been an evolution in approach to the 
prov1s1ons. 
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The case notes also present a broader issue for the researcher trying to gam an 
overall view of how the provisions have been applied. As we have seen, statistical 
analysis of the Case Notes is problematic. Recent trends in freedom of information 
practices overseas rely heavily on statistical analysis in order to measure 
administrative compliance with freedom of information statutes, as well as overall 
effectiveness of the legislation. 106 Clearly, the case notes, being a small (and not 
necessarily representative) sample of the total cases investigated by the Ombudsmen 
do not provide a good basis for such analysis. 107 
B. The Revised Practice Guidelines 
The Guidelines issued by the Ombudsman provide another important point of 
reference for those seeking to understand the OIA, and the Ombudsman's 
interpretation of it. A revised set of Guidelines have very recently been released by 
the Ombudsmen, covering all withholding grounds, including the ones we are 
concerned with ("the revised Guidelines"). 108 
The revised Guidelines do not represent a revolution over what has previously been 
available, but they are far more detailed and provide a good basis for further 
comparison. Withholders requiring to apply the provisions in practice would be well 
advised to give the Revised Guidelines very close attention, while bearing in mind 
that they are not intended to "detract from the need to take a case by case approach 
when considering requests." 109 
'
06 See for example Roberts, Alasdair "Limited Access: Assessing the Health of Canada's Freedom 
of Information Laws" (April 1998) School of Policy Studies, Queens University 
107 It should be noted that even if the Ombudsmen produced case notes on all investigations 
commenced - which is likely to be an administrative impossibility - thi s would only provide 
additional information on the matters subject to complaint. 
108 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) 
'
09 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) General Introduction , I 
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(i) Considerations for Conventions 
A 'Summary sheet' for section 9(2)(f)(iv) suggests that the holder is required to: 
1. Identify the convention being relied upon. 
2. Identify the purpose of that convention. 
3. Assess whether, in light of that purpose, it is necessary to withhold the requested 
information in order to maintain the convention. 
It is noted that "If you have identified the convention and its purpose, and consider 
that releasing the information will undermine that convention and can explain why, 
then section 9(2)(f)(iv) may apply." 110 A withholder should then consider whether 
public interest considerations favouring release outweigh the need to withhold. 111 
The Revised Guidelines accordingly place an obligation upon withholders to 
formulate the convention(s) at issue, and, if anything, require an even greater 
understanding of the conventions and their purposes than previously. However, the 
revised Guidelines are not forthcoming about the convention being relied upon, 
stating that "the wording of section 9(2)(f)(iv) suggests that in certain circumstances 
the convention allows advice tendered to Ministers to be kept confidential." 
This comment may be seen as relatively unhelpful, given the difficulties in this area 
that have been discussed. It also might be noted that in discussions of the other 
subsections contained in section 9(2)(f) certain other conventions are discussed in 
some detail. In this regard it is noteworthy that the Ombudsman has, (in ' draft 
Revised Guidelines' contained in CCN012), set out a fairly specific formulation of 
the convention at issue: 
110 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part B, Chapter 4.5 
111 Further steps in considering thi s are set out; Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) 
Part B, Chapter 4.5. 
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"Section 9(2)(f)(iv), in particular, reflects the convention that, in a Cabinet system of 
government, where advice has been tendered by officials or individual Ministers for 
consideration by Cabinet that advice may need to remain confidential to allow 
Cabinet to consider it in an effective and orderly manner." 112 
While the above formulation is laudably precise, it also appears unnecessarily 
narrow. There would seem to be nothing obvious in the construction of section 
9(2)(f)(iv) that limits its application to advice tendered to Cabinet, and certainly 
previous Case Notes indicate that the provision may apply where advice has been 
tendered to a Minister only. 113 It would also appear to have the potential to 'block' 
further evolution of the conventions at issue, as allowed for under the construction of 
the provision. It may be for these reasons that the Ombudsmen have not 
incorporated this formulation in the revised Guidelines. However, this earlier 
statement does provide some important clues as to the underlying approach that may 
be being adopted by the Ombudsmen in assessing the proper withholding of 
information under this provision. 
(ii) The overlap between Advice and Opinion 
The revised Guidelines does not expressly refer to an 'overlap' between the 
provisions. It is however observed that the same information ("internal discussion 
papers") may be withheld as advice or opinion. 114 The overall construction and 
emphasis of the revised Guidelines implies an expectation that withholders will be 
able to identify that one or other of the provisions will apply in any given case, 
112 CCN012, 25 
113 This was the case, for example, in CC 05 Case 42 (G R Laking) 
114 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Pat1 B, Chapter 4.5. This is consistent with 
previous case notes; for example CC O I O Case W3808 again 
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rarely both. 115 The point 1s again reinforced that the question of the correct 
provision to apply is contingent upon what interest is to be protected. 116 
(iii) 'Untendered' Advice? 
A significant comment is made in the revised Guidelines in relation to 'tendered 
advice' that in 'limited circumstances' section 9(2)(f)(iv) may apply where the 
information has not been tendered at the time of the request. The comment is made 
that "(t)his situation may occur where internal discussion papers are circulated 
within an agency or between agencies prior to the tendering of formal advice to a 
Minister." 117 Accordingly, it is allowed that section 9(2)(f)(iv) might provide good 
grounds for withholding the internal discussion papers if the withholder's concern is 
"that release of internal discussion papers will undermine the ability of Ministers to 
consider the advice that will be tendered in an effective and orderly manner". 11 8 
This is a realistic approach. If the aim is to 'maintain the constitutional convention' 
protecting 'the confidentiality of advice tendered. ' then as a matter of logic it would 
seem that release of a draft undermining the confidentiality of advice to be tendered 
would not maintain the convention. It may often be the case that the release of a 
draft will interfere with a Minister's consideration of the final advice. As will be 
seen, this comment may go some way to addressing particular concerns of officials 
in this area. 
(iv) 'The context of-free and /rank opinions ' 
The revised Guidelines suggest that the agency consult those who generated the 
information at issue and explore whether and why the release of the information 
115 This seems to be an evolution from earlier case notes where the Ombudsman had no difficulty in 
finding that both provisions provided grounds for withholding; for example CCNO I O Case W3808 (J 
Robertson), 58 
116 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines, above 
117 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines, above 
118 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines, above 
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would "inhibit the expression of free and frank opinion by them in the future." 119 
The revised Guidelines note that, while the opinion of the author of the effect on 
their behaviour of release of the information at issue will be a relevant consideration, 
it will not be determinative. 120 
Objective factors are also to be taken into account, and interestingly the revised 
Guidelines suggest that senior managers are expected to be less likely to be inhibited 
as a result of the release of information than junior employees; and similarly, policy 
advisers or departmental officials "are expected to be more robust about their 
opinions" than those from outside govemment. 121 
Even as a generalisation, this point seems arguable. Given the quite different 
implications of the release of the same ' free and frank' opinion made by a Chief 
Executive as against a junior employee (one may achieve headline status, with the 
other passing without notice), it may be seen that the ' inhibitive' effect of release 
could be greater upon the Chief Executive. Furthermore, given that the interest to be 
protected is the maintenance of the effective conduct of public affairs, it could be 
argued that even a slight impact upon a Chief Executive's willingness to express 
opinions freely and frankly could outweigh a more significant impact upon the 
junior employee. 
Another consideration to be taken into account is the relationship between the author 
and intended recipient. The revised Guidelines note: "Is advice or opinion usually 
conveyed between these persons in a formal manner, or is it often expressed in an 
informal and frank fashion?" and also "If advice is usually conveyed informally, will 
119 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002), above 
JJo The suggestion that the writer' s opinion be sought may be contrasted with the proposition by 
Eagles, Taggart and Liddell that the writer' s opinion would be unlikely to assist the argument; I 
Eagles, M Taggart and G Liddell, Freedom of information in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1992) at 374 . 
m Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part B, Chapter 4.6 
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release of the information at issue damage such an informal and frank relationship in 
the future?" 122 
This indicates that the Ombudsmen consider that informal relationships 
characterised by the giving of 'free and frank' opinion may be afforded some 
protection by section 9(2)(g)(i). However, again it is important to see this as a 
general proposition only. An illustration of this is contained in the latest 
Ombudsman's Annual Report, which contains comment on an investigation into the 
approach taken by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to information 
requests. After considering evidence (including statements from two former Prime 
Ministers), the Ombudsmen accepted that the relationship between the Policy 
Advisory Group and the Prime Minister of the day had a number of characteristics 
that might 'heighten the need for confidentiality' .123 However, this did not "negate 
the need for a case-by-case assessment of whether there is good reason in terms of 
the Official Infonnation Act to withhold specific information." 124 There is to be no 
exemption for a 'class' of information. 
Overall the revised Guidelines reinforce the proposition that section 9(2)(g)(i) may 
often be useful where information has been given in a particularly blunt fashion, 
noting it can be "the manner in which the information is expressed that requires 
protection, rather than the information itself'. In such cases, the revised Guidelines 
suggest that "a summary of the content of the information can often be released 
without harm". 125 
122 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part B, Chapter 4.6 
123 Report of the Ombudsmen for the Year ended 30 Jun e 2002 (AJHR, A.3, 2002), 31-32. These 
characteristics included the personal nature of the relationship, reliant upon trust; the fact that it often 
required free and frank expression of opinions in assessments of the views of other departments and 
even Ministers ; memoranda written under time pressure. 
124 Report of the Ombudsmen for the Year ended 30 June 2002 (AJHR, A.3, 2002), 30. The 
Headlines generated by these comments underline the charged political context of these types of 
decision- see "Secrecy rebuke for PM's officials" (20 September 2002) Th e Dominion, Wellington, I. 
125 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part B, Chapter 4.6. 
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(v) Factual Material under the Revised Guidelines 
In relation to factual material when discussing section 9(2)(f)(iv) and 'tendered 
advice' , the revised Guidelines preserve the status quo by maintaining a broad view 
of the scope of 'advice ' (as advice may be "purely factual in nature" or simply 
provide options), but also caution that 'advice ' comprising factual material is less 
likely to require protection than more conventional forms. 126 
In discussion of section 9(2)(g)(i) the revised Guidelines confirm that an agency 
should consider whether the information at issue contains free and frank expressions 
of opinion. 127 However, there is a suggestion that some information might be 
withheld even when it does not contain such expressions: "If the information at 
issue comprises free and frank expressions of opinion, then it is more likely that 
disclosure would inhibit such free and frank expression in future similar 
circumstances." (emphasis added). 128 
Accordingly, the revised Guidelines would seem to admit the possibility that factual 
material could be withheld pursuant to this provision in appropriate circumstances. 
It is hard to conceive of how this might occur, although it may be that the 
Ombudsmen have encountered just such an argument. However, in this regard the 
revised Guidelines further emphasise the possibility of separating and releasing 
information of a background or factual nature. Indeed (and as was also pointed out 
to the author by the Ombudsman at interview), it may often be the case that this 
provision is relied upon to edit a relatively small portion of a document, that portion 
containing the ' blunt advice ' . 129 
1
!
6 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part 8 , Chapter 4. 5. 
m Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part 8 , Chapter 4.6. 
t!B Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) above, Chapter 4.6. 
!!
9 Interview with Sir Brian Elwood, Chi ef Ombudsman, (the author, Wellington , 6 September 
2002). 
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(vi) Release when Decision Made 
There are implications for the application of section 9(2)(f)(iv) where a decision has 
been made; the revised Guidelines include the comment that "[o]nce a decision is 
made, there may be no need for ongoing protection of the advice on which that 
decision was based." It is further noted that the release of information after the 
decision is made can serve to explain to the public the rationales behind the decision, 
and is consistent with the purposes of the Act. 130 
Accordingly, it would seem that there is a likelihood that once a decision is made, 
the information at issue may be released. This approach has also been taken in 
previous case notes. 131 However, the converse is not true. In Part E of the revised 
Guidelines, 'common misconceptions' are commented upon. Two 'common 
misconceptions' raised in relation to section 9(2)(f)(iv) are that "Ministers and 
Cabinet have a right to "undisturbed consideration" of advice" ( emphasis in 
01iginal); and that "advice may be withheld until a decision is made by Ministers or 
Cabinet." The revised Guidelines confirm that no such right or presumption exists. 
In each case the withholding agency is obliged to provide reasons why release will 
interfere with the decision making process. 
(vii) Release in the Public Interest 
In the event that all the above tests are met, the agency is then required to consider 
section 9(1) of the OIA and whether the need to withhold is "outweighed by other 
considerations which render it desirable, in the public interest, to make that 
information available." The revised Guidelines set out a 3 step process m 
considering this, which includes taking into account whether release of the 
information will promote the accountability of ministers or officials, (which could 
occur where release revealed factors taken ( or not taken) into account by ministers 
130 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part B, Chapter 4.5 . This is consistent with 
previous case notes addressing this point; see for example CCNO I 0, Case W2 l 59 (J Roberts), 44. 
13 1 See for example CCNO 11, case W36084 (A. Satyanand) 
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or officials in corning to a decision). Overall, however it is accepted that in deciding 
whether the public interest outweighs the interest in maintaining the convention 
protected by the provisions " .. each case needs to be considered carefully on its own 
merits and taking into account the surrounding circumstances." 132 
Assessing whether the 'public interest override' applies once one or other of the 
provisions have been made out could prove to be a delicate task in many cases. The 
process of establishing that section 9(2)(g)(i) applies would in particular appear to 
already incorporate some consideration of the public interest. 
This might in turn partly explain why the public interest override appears to be 
seldom applied where one or other of the provisions have been made out; this 
appears to have occurred only once or twice in the entire case notes. 
(viii) The Revised Guidelines Conclusion 
The revised Guidelines provide a far more detailed exposition of those matters that 
the Ombudsmen consider relevant in the application of the provisions than has ever 
been available previously. Despite this , it is notable that many of the difficulties 
identified in the earlier analysis persist. In particular, issues may persist with the 
identification of the convention(s) protected under section 9(2)(f)(iv) (although 
certainly additional clues are available regarding these). 
Perhaps most usefully, the revised Guidelines also complete a shift in emphasis from 
consideration of what 'especially free and frank' opinions may be protected under 
section 9(2)(g)(i) to focus upon what effects the release of ' free and frank' opinions 
might be expected to have - although again, it is difficult to discern what thresholds 
apply here. 
131 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part 8, Chapter 4.5 and 4.6. 
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Overall, the revised Guidelines make it clear that the provisions require an extremely 
complex and demanding analysis. From what are in structure very simple, open 
textured provisions, the Ombudsman have drawn a very intricate and interwoven set 
of considerations. From the point of view of a withholder surveying the various 
steps and matters to be considered, there can be little doubt that the overall process 
may appear daunting and uncertain. 
V THE PROVISIONS IN PRACTICE 
A. Questions of Compliance 
In discussing the issues that arise with the use of the provisions in practice, it is 
useful to consider these in terms of compliance with both the provisions of the OIA 
and its objectives. In the context of freedom of information legislation (and 
particularly with reference to withholding provisions), failure to release information 
on faulty grounds clearly may be seen as non-compliance. 133 Further forms of non-
compliance may involve 'protective' measures such as delay or reliance upon verbal 
advice. 134 
In the absence of detailed statistical information on the use of the provisions, one of 
the few ways in which it is possible to explore their use is to talk to officials who 
make use of them. In order to obtain a better view of the issues arising in practice, 
the author interviewed the Chief Ombudsman, together with five professionals who 
worked with the OIA closely in their professional life. 135 Some of those spoken to 
had cause to consider the provisions on virtually a daily basis. While this was not a 
133 A review of the Case Notes relevant to the provisions indicate that in more than half of the cases 
at least part of the decision to withhold is ove1iu111ed on investigation by the Ombudsmen. 
134 The latest Ombudsmen's Report records 'notable delays ' on the part of some holders; Report of 
th e Ombudsmen for the Year ended 30 Jun e 2002 (AJHR, A.3, 2002), 27. 
135 See Interview Details appended to the paper. Those interviewed will not be identified (other than 
the Chief Ombudsman) and will be referred to collectively as "officials". 
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formal survey, these discussions were invaluable in clarifying the main issues that 
officials grappled with in utilising the provisions in practice. 
At the time of the discussions, the Ombudsman's revised Guidelines had not been 
released. As will be seen, however, while those Guidelines will undoubtedly have 
an impact in this area, many of the more significant issues are likely to remain. 
(i) Complexity of Analysis 
Several officials spoken to noted that the provisions required very sophisticated or 
complicated chains of argument (particularly in view of the approaches taken to 
them by successive Ombudsmen). This is perhaps unsurprising in light of the 
difficulties of application already outlined. There are some evident compliance 
issues likely to arise from this, including: 
(a) That the complexity of application could lead to incorrect application. In 
compliance terms, the provisions could be invoked mistakenly to withhold 
information, or alternatively opinions and advice that ought to be protected by the 
provisions could be released. 
(b) Complexity of analysis could also lead to different practices or approaches being 
adopted towards the provisions in different pa11s of government. 
( c) The prov1s1ons might not be used to protect information that should be 
protected, due to perceived difficulties in maintaining the necessary arguments in the 
face of an Ombudsman ' s investigation. 
In relation to section 9(2)(f)(iv), it was commonly observed by officials that the 
requirement to identify the convention to be protected was the most difficult task 
facing the decision maker. Again, this may be unsurprising, given the early 
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approach taken by the Ombudsman to this task as discussed. The Ombudsman too 
has acknowledged the difficulties facing officials here. 136 However, the revised 
Guidelines confirm that there is a heavy onus on withholders to formulate and 
understand the conventions at issue, while providing little in the way of clear 
guidance on the issue. 
Similarly, in relation to section 9(2)(g)(i), several officials felt that the analysis 
required was a difficult one, particularly in the areas of establishing the view that the 
withholding was necessary to 'maintain the effective conduct of public affairs', and 
also in divining what, in the Ombudsmen's view, was a 'free and frank opinion' 
warranting protection. The revised Guidelines may provide some assistance here, 
with further emphasis being placed on the effect of release, rather than establishing 
that the opinion is ' especially free and frank'. However, it might also be considered 
that in introducing a number of additional specific factors to be taken into account 
(such as the seniority of the author of the opinion), the reasoning process required 
has become even more involved. 
This issue also should be considered in light of the current environment that requests 
in this area are made in. The Ombudsmen have noted that requests have become far 
more encompassing; while initially requests made under the Act tended to focus on 
specific documents, more recently requests have become far more encompassing, 
often requiring documents together with all drafts, communications and other 
materials associated with the principal documents. 137 It also is important to note 
that a considerable number of requests for infonnation in this area are generated by 
136 As has already been noted, the Ombudsmen have acknowledged this task as difficult; 
Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines - o 2 "Current Approach of Ombudsman to Section 9(2)(f)(iv) 
& Section 9(2)(g)(i) of the Official Information Act 1982" ( 1993) para 2.5 (now revised) . 
137 This has lead the Ombudsmen to note that while the OJA does not expressly preclude 'fishing 
expeditions', s 18(f) of the Act may on occasion be invoked where information cannot be made 
available without substantial collation and research; Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 
2002) Part 8 , Chapter 2.4. 
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Opposition Research Units, a use of the Act that was not initially anticipated. 138 The 
combined effect of these factors is that agencies are often being required to apply the 
very involved tests required by the provisions on a case by case basis to very large 
numbers of documents, while under time pressure and often in a highly politically 
charged context. 
A further complicating factor in terms of application of the prov1s1ons (and in 
particular, section 9(2)(f)(iv)) is the advent of MMP; the Revised Guidelines point 
out that MMP "has created a new context in which section 9(2)(f)(iv) must operate". 
139 It seems that principles of application of the provisions have been developing, 
and may continue to develop, in response to MMP. For example, the Revised 
Guidelines have observed in this context that "premature release of information 
before full consultation has between coalition partners occurred may prejudice the 
ability of those partners to reach agreement", noting that such a case might require 
protection under section 9(2)(f)(iv). 140 However it is further observed that where the 
opposing views of the coalition partners have been the subject of public debate there 
may be no prejudice in releasing the information at issue. 141 
Against this changing background, even some of the senior and experienced officials 
interviewed acknowledged the scope for mistakes in application of the provisions. 
Many decisions will be made on the use of the provisions by officers who are not so 
experienced. Some anecdotal evidence was provided during interviews that 
different sections of government may be applying quite different approaches to the 
provisions. It was also observed that even amongst the senior officials spoken to, 
those officials commonly dealing with the executive considered section 9(2)(f)(iv) 
relatively straightforward to apply and section 9(2)(g)(i) difficult, whereas those 
more concerned with 'operational' matters tended to take the reverse view. 
138 See Philip A. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2"d ed, 2001), 160. 
139 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part B, Chapter 4.5. 
140 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) above. 
141 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) above. 
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(ii) Use of the Provisions as Alternates 
As has been discussed, there is a potential issue that arises in terms of selecting the 
appropriate provision to apply in a given case, and the extent to which they overlap. 
This was discussed with a number of interviewees. 
In terms of coming to a decision as to which (if either) of the provisions properly 
applied, it was commonly appreciated that section 9(2)(f)(iv) was more 
appropriately invoked in relation to advice tendered in an executive context (to 
Cabinet), and that in contrast section 9(2)(g)(i) was more concerned with lower 
level, 'operational' opinions. In other words, the 'executive' vs 'government' 
division (emphasised in the 121h Compendium of Case Notes) appeared to be 
reflected in the wider understanding of how the provisions were applied amongst 
those who use them regularly. 
Despite this, on discussions with officials it appeared to be not uncommon practice 
to cite both provisions in justifying a decision to withhold a given item of 
information. 142 It seems in such a case officials would place most emphasis on 
arguing the grounds of the provision that appeared most appropriate, but the other 
subsection would also be used as a backup (and in case it turned out that the 
Ombudsman considered the alternative more relevant). As has been noted above, 
there is some evidence that this has been a common practice from the introduction of 
the Act. 143 
However, the Chief Ombudsman made it clear to the author on this point that it was 
generally not appropriate for officials to tend to rely on both provisions as alternates, 
142 It may be assumed in such cases both provisions will be cited to the requester as grounds for 
refusal, as well as on a subsequent investigation by the Ombudsmen. 
w The Law Commission has also observed " [t]he very limited recorded separate use of section 
9(2)(f)(iv)"; Law Commission Protecting Effective Government and Administration (Draft 23 
Wellington, 1993), 21 (this comment appears to be reliant upon the case notes recorded). 
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and that in many instances there is a clear distinction between expressions of opinion 
and the provision of advice. 144 Accordingly, there would seem to be a compliance 
issue arising here in that officials may be relying on ' alternate ' grounds for 
withholding unnecessarily. They may be forgiven for doing so, for as we have seen 
the provisions are on their face difficult to keep separate conceptually, and the 
material available until very recently has not assisted greatly in trus regard. 
Nonetheless, the reliance on ' redundant ' withholding grounds has the potential to 
confuse requesters and delay subsequent investigations by the Ombudsman. 
The resort to 'alternate ' withholding grounds by officials might also indicate a 
deeper compliance issue, in that such an approach provides a clue that officials may 
tend to be more focused upon the withholding of the particular information to hand, 
rather than upon the respective interests to be protected. As has been emphasised in 
the revised Guidelines, the Ombudsmen 's view is that the correct basis for 
determining which provision to apply is upon consideration of which interest is to be 
protected. Nonetheless, if an official is considering a request for an item of 
information that has the potential to cause considerable embarrassment or negative 
impacts upon the decision making process, it may often be the case that the main 
concern is that the item be withheld, rather than the details of how precisely it is 
withheld. 
(iii) The Implications on Behaviour 
A consequence of the levels of uncertainty about when the provisions might act to 
protect certain advice and opinion is that this might affect behaviour, or the 'culture ' 
in the public sector concerning the treatment of trus type of information. This can 
result in approaches being taken to certain 'sensitive ' opinion or advice designed to 
avoid the potential for subsequent release. An obvious example, and one noted as a 
14
~ Interview with Sir Bri an Elwood, Chi ef Ombudsman, (the author, Wellington, 6 September 
2002). 
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real concern by some officials spoken to, is the provision of advice and/or opinions 
in verbal form. 
The Ombudsmen have taken the position that verbal (and other unwritten) 
information can be subject to the OIA. 145 However, review of the Case Notes 
indicates that requests for such information are infrequent. 146 Accordingly, there is 
potential for certain items of important and sensitive advice or opinion to be 
provided verbally. 147 
The compliance issues arising from such an approach are two-fold; firstly, some 
information that should be available in terms of the OIA may be effectively put 
beyond its reach. Secondly, the provision of oral advice where written advice 
should be provided has implications for the clarity, reliability and ability to refer 
back to that advice. Therefore such an approach may impact on the overall effective 
conduct of public affairs. 
When the issue of verbal advice was put to the Chief Ombudsman, he acknowledged 
that "that is a very real risk based on misunderstanding and therefore unnecessary 
fear". From the Ombudsman's point of view, a sensible approach has been taken to 
the provisions that ensures that the interests involved receive the required protection, 
without going so far as to create a 'climate of secrecy for decision making'. 148 
145 Ombudsmen ' s Quarterly Review " Application of Official Information legislation to non-
documentary information" (4/3, Wellington , September 1998), I . 
146 An exception may be found in CCNO 12 Case W4 l 57 l (Sir Brian Elwood) . 
147 This has been raised as a particular concern ; see Matthew S. R. Palmer, " Ministerial 
Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: Conflict or Complement?" (Institute for 
International Research conference, Wellington, 4 April 2001), 15. 
148 Interview with Sir Brian Elwood, Chief Ombudsman, (the author, Wellington, 6 September 
2002). 
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However, the reservations on the part of officials seem to persist. Discussions with 
officials indicated that uncertainty about the likelihood of being able to successfully 
rely on the provisions (or other withholding grounds) may permeate through to 
written advice and opinion also. In other words, it is not the case that documents 
comprising advice or opinion are prepared in the expectation that they will be 
protected by disclosure by one or other of the provisions. 149 This was noted by one 
interviewee as having lead to a 'culture' within the public service that sees virtually 
all official information as liable to release under the OIA. As a result, most 
instances of appeal to the provisions are almost of an 'accidental' nature. This has 
implications both for the quality of argument that can be raised in appealing to the 
provisions, and raises further questions about how effective the provisions are in 
protecting the interests they are designed to protect. 
There may also be 'cultural' issues affecting whether arguments are pursued in 
support of withholding information, particularly in relation to section 9(2)(g)(i). 
One official spoken to pointed out that the train of argument needed to support 
withholding under that section involved itself very 'free and frank' arguments; the 
person who produced the opinion in question needs in effect to say that they would 
have been inhibited in producing the opinion if they had known that it would be 
subsequently made public. Further, they need to go on to contend that they would 
be reluctant in future to produce similar opinions if the one at issue is released, and 
that this would have negative impacts upon the future conduct of public affairs. 150 It 
was conunented that civil servants were often reluctant to argue that they could not 
do their jobs properly if their opinions were to be made public. 
149 The exception to this may be advice tendered to Cabinet where there persists an expectation that 
the advice will be able to be withheld pursuant to section 9(2)(f)(iv) while under consideration by 
Cabinet. 
150 It may be noted that the revised Practice Guidelines indicate that this type of argument may be 
required; Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part B, Chapter 4.6. 
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The results of this could include information being released (perhaps in the face of a 
complaint to the Ombudsmen), simply because of a reluctance to advance the 
necessary arguments. This attitude could also mean that the occurrence of the sort 
of 'blunt' advice considered important by the Dank's committee might become even 
less frequent (at least in written form). Without more detailed evidence, it is 
impossible to assess the implications for this on the overall effectiveness of 
communications in the conduct of public affairs. 
This particular issue may only be underscored with the introduction of the revised 
Guidelines, particularly where the opinion has been produced by a senior official, 
given the expectation that senior public sector managers are be expected to continue 
to express free and frank opinions in the future, despite any disclosure. 151 
(iv) The Question o(Timing 
Timing is a crucial consideration when dealing with information, which can be 
regarded as a 'perishable commodity'. There are a number of ways in which timing 
issues may impact on compliance with the OIA as a whole. 152 In terms of the 
provisions under consideration, the major compliance issues involving timing would 
appear to arise where there was deliberate resort to the provisions in order to delay 
responses to information requests. Alternatively, mistaken reliance upon the 
provisions could thwart the purpose of an information request, even if it was 
ultimately released following investigation by the Ombudsman. 153 
While the possibility of abuse of the provisions in order to achieve delay was not 
directly canvassed in discussions with officials, it is evident that in cases where a 
151 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) above. 
15
! Delays and deemed refusals are the second largest category of complaints after refusals ; see ew 
Zealand Law Commission Review of the Official Information Act 1982 ( ZLC40, Wellington, 1997) 
para 153. 
153 The Ombudsmen 's investigation may be a lengthy process; the recent investigation of complaints 
regarding DPMC was reported to have taken over a year; see "Secrecy rebuke for PM's officials" (20 
September 2002) The Dominion, Wellington, I . 
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delay was desirable, the generality of the provisions (both in the wording of the 
provisions and the range of government information they could apply to) could lead 
them to being misused for this purpose. The prospect of this form of abuse of the 
withholding provisions is often commented upon by observers and in the media. 154 
Again, there is little hard evidence to draw any conclusions from in terms of how 
significant a problem such misuse might be. When asked about potential misuse of 
the provisions by officials, the Chief Ombudsman noted that it was "[ v ]ery hard to 
be absolute" in commenting on this, as the Ombudsmen only dealt with that 
proportion of OIA refusals actually referred for investigation. 155 However, in 
commenting further on compliance, Sir Brian placed some emphasis on timing 
ISsues: 
"I think there is a pretty good compliance once we become involved. I think there 
are probably too many occasions upon which we do have to become involved. On 
the other hand there are many situations where there's a very fine judgement call 
particularly in relation to the public interest and often it is a matter of timing, when 
should the information be released. I think a creditable Ombudsman process helps 
sort out those difficult questions." 156 
The fact that questions of timing could pose 'difficult questions ' was a point also 
noted by some officials. In particular, issues were said to arise where a decision had 
been made on 'advice', at which point it was felt that the Ombudsman might often 
expect that the advice would be able to be released. As we have seen in discussion 
154 See for example Alastair Morrison, "The Games People Play: Journalism and the Official 
Information Act" in Legal Research Foundation, The Official Information Act Seminar Papers: 
General Overview of Official Information and th e Official Information Act ( 1997), 30. Interview with 
Sir Brian Elwood, Chief Ombudsman, (the author, Wellington , 6 September 2002). 
155 Interview with Sir Brian Elwood, Chief Ombudsman, (the author, Wellington, 6 September 
2002). 
156 Interview with Sir Brian Elwood, Chief Ombudsman, (the author, Wellington, 6 September 
2002) . 
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of the reYised Guidelines. this has recently been raised as a general proposition. c 
Howe\·er. on such decisions the de\·il lies in the detail as the Chief Ombudsman 
seems to acknO\Yledge. It may be. for example. that a decision is made on the item 
of adYice at issue. but that this decision forms part of a larger policy-making process 
that is continuing and requires protection to proceed · in an effecti\·e and orderly 
manner. 
It is al o a reality that \Ye liYe in an age of· pin· and that there i an ever increasing 
imperati\·e to manage the release of significant policy decisions. The OL\ contains 
some pro\·ision for the \Yithholding of information that "is or 11 ill soon be publicly 
arnilable. "i: ome official spoken to percei\·ed pos ibilitie for ·gap · to occur in 
the \,ithholding regime. between where certain ad\·ice might be protected under 
section 9 2 f) iY . for example. and where it might be con idered to · oon be 
publicly a\·ailable. · It is hard to as ess ho\,. significant an issue this may be. It 
might be anticipated that the Ombudsman would say the question of whether any 
further protection was afforded \\·ould entirely depend on whether this \Yas necessary 
in order to protect the com·ention concerned. To determine \\·hether this is so or not 
depends on the circwnstances of the particular case. and of necessity im·oh·es .. a 
very fine judgment calr". 
fr) Draft and Facmal _\faleria/ 
A potential problem relating to draft ad\·ice was raised in a number of interYiews. 
This is a particular issue in light of the fact that nry broad information requests are 
becoming increasingly common. A.s we ha\·e seen. on a trier interpretation of the 
subsection. such drafts may not be considered to be ·tendered· to cabinet indeed. 
cabinet can safely be assumed not to ha\·e seen them . Accordingly. the concern 
exists that drafts might not be ubject to any protection under section 9(_) f)(i\} yet 
their disclosure might in some cases be expected to interfere with the executiYe 
,_. - :\.nd also m the case notes: ee CC'\011. Case \\'360 J (:\. atyanand). 
5
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decision making process just as much as, if not more so than, disclosure of the 
principal advice. 
In compliance terms, the concern might be expressed as whether the conventions to 
be maintained by section 9(2)(f)(iv) may be eroded through the use of widely 
formulated information requests, achieving a 'back door' access to decision making 
processes requiring protection. 
To an extent these concerns may be allayed by the recent Guidelines. The 
Ombudsman has made in clear in those Guidelines that the information at issue need 
not itselfhave been 'tendered', and that the provision may 'in limited circumstances' 
cover internal discussion papers relating to papers yet to be tendered to a Minister or 
Cabinet. 159 This would appear to be a valid approach, as the protection of the 
convention(s) relating to "the confidentiality of advice tendered" could, in some 
cases, require the protection of drafts (and associated information). Again, this 
analysis is in each case likely to involve careful consideration of the information at 
issue and all relevant circumstances. 
(vi) Conclusions on the Provisions in Practice 
It is evident that officials have a number of significant concerns and issues in 
relation to the ambit and proper application of the provisions. In summary, 
difficulties noted included: 
1. The reasonmg processes required to utilise the prov1s10ns are excessively 
complex and uncertain - in particular, the formulation of the 'convention' in 
section 9(2)(f)(iv); 
159 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Part B, Chapter 4.5. 
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2. Uncertainty about the ambit of the provisions means that protective behaviours 
such as the combined use of the provisions, the giving of opinion and advice 
verbally and delay tactics can and do occur. 
3. That in the public sector the predominant 'culture' anticipates public release for 
virtually all information, further rendering resort to the provisions problematic; 
4. That issues relating to the timing of release of advice and opinions are 
insufficiently clear; 
5. That questions relating to the protection afforded drafts and factual information 
are also insufficiently clear; 
As we have also seen, each of these issues has at least the potential to significantly 
impact upon compliance with the OIA; either by having the effect that information is 
withheld (or not released in a timely manner) without good reason, or alternatively 
by insufficiently protecting the conduct of public affairs. 
The revised Guidelines were released after the interviews were conducted with 
officials, and it seems likely that they may have a positive effect on some of the 
concerns raised, particularly in providing some clarification of the Ombudsmen's 
approach in distinguishing the scope of application of each provision, for example. 
It is also clear from the Guidelines that draft and other documentation can be 
brought within the protection of section 9(2)(f)(iv) in appropriate circumstances. 160 
However, it is likely that many issues will remam, and some may even be 
exacerbated by the contents of the revised Guidelines. 161 It may be expected that 
the compliance issues will continue to arise so long as officials are unsure of the 
160 It is perhaps unfortunate that there is little data available which would permit analysis of the 
scope of the issues now, and that would allow comparison once the revised Guidelines had entered 
into general awareness within the public sector. 
161 The expectation on senior officials to be 'frank' despite the likelihood of disclosure of such 
opinion being an example. 
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scope of the provisions, and accordingly either withhold information wrongly, or 
adopt other 'protective' measures such as providing oral advice and opinion. 
VI ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS; AMENDMENT OR ADMINISTRATION? 
As we have seen, there appear to be a number of significant issues with the 
provisions that have the potential to seriously affect their proper operation. Overall, 
these problems seem to arise from a complex of interrelated matters involving the 
construction of the provisions themselves, as well as the approaches taken to them 
by both the Ombudsmen and the officials who use them. There are difficulties also 
in relation to accurately discerning the scope and extent of these compliance issues. 
In considering what options for resolving these problems, two broad categories of 
solution may be considered; legislative or administrative. Each of these will be 
considered in tum. 
A. The Options for Legislative Reform 
(i) A Categorical Approach 
One possible (if radical) approach to addressing some of the issues that have been 
identified with the provisions could be to replace the broad, purposive construction 
of the provisions with more prescriptive, 'categorical' sections. 
Such an approach has been taken in drafting legislation in this area in other 
jurisdictions, including Australia and Canada.
162 As an approximate equivalent of 
162 See sections 2 l and 69 Access to lnfo1mation Act 1985 (Canada) and sections 35 and 36 Freedom 
of Information Act 1982 (Australia). 
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section 9(2)(f)(iv), section 34(1) of the Australian Freedom of Information Act 1982 
("Fol" Act) renders each of the following documents exempt from the ambit of the 
Act: 
a document brought into existence for the purpose of submission to the Cabinet 
which has been, or is proposed by a minister to be submitted to Cabinet; 
an official record of Cabinet; 
a copy or an extract from a document covered above; and 
a document, the discussion of which would involve the disclosure of any 
deliberation or decision of the Cabinet, other than a document by which a 
decision of the Cabinet was officially disclosed. 163 
It is significant that the Fol Act is a document-based statute, in contrast to the OlA's 
emphasis on information. Importantly, the above section sets out classes of 
documents that are exempt from the statute, rather than providing grounds for 
withholding. No 'public interest' test applies. Interestingly, the exemption does not 
apply to documents that contain purely factual material unless release of that 
material would involve disclosure of any unpublished deliberation or decision of 
Cabinet. 164 
A public interest test does however apply in the Australian equivalent to section 
9(2)(g)(i), which can be found in s 36(1) of the Fol Act which exempts documents 
the disclosure of which: 
(a) would disclose matter in the nature of, or relating to, opm10n, advice or 
recommendation obtained, prepared or recorded, or consultation or deliberation 
that has taken place, in the course of, or for the purposes of, the deliberative 
163 Freedom of lnfon11ation Act 1982 section 34( I). 
16
~ freedom of Jnfo1mation Act 1982 (Australia) section 34( I A). 
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processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the 
Government of the Commonwealth; and 
(b) would be contrary to the public interest. 
The type of prescriptive (but, in some ways, much more encompassing) approach 
taken to protecting 'government process' information might be argued as conferring 
some distinct advantages in the present context. The Australian approach does not 
require officials to identify conventions or to tease out the distinctions between 'free 
and frank opinion' and 'tendered advice' .165 Certainly, such an approach will be far 
easier for officials to apply (and, in all likelihood, the Ombudsmen also). 
The Australian legislation also provides for a relatively simple process to 'veto ' 
further review of a decision to withhold information; the Freedom of Information 
Act allows for a minister ( or delegated officer) to provide a certificate 'establishing 
conclusively' that disclosure of the document would be contrary to the public 
interest. This is comparable to the 'ministerial veto ' that used to exist in the OIA. 166 
However, overseas experience indicates that the 'category' approach taken in this 
area is fraught with its own problems when it comes to compliance issues. 167 While 
the categorical approach would undoubtedly provide more robust and easy to apply 
protection to governmental advice and opinions, it would almost certainly tip the 
balance back too far towards governmental secrecy. This was certainly the 
conclusion of the Law Commission when it (briefly) considered this approach. The 
Law Commission concluded that a redraft along 'categorical' lines could well 
impose significant restrictions on information where if anything the current trend is 
165 Nor do the equivalent Canadian provisions. 
166 Replaced in 1987 by the 'cabinet veto ' ; s 18 Official Information Amendment Act 1987. 
167 Sir Brian Elwood described some of these drawbacks in a recent address given for the New 
Zealand Centre for Public Law at Victoria University (Wellington , 25 July 2002). 
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for greater availability and transparency. 168 A 'categorical' approach lacks the 
flexibility of the existing provisions, and therefore would need to cover wide classes 
of information in order to ensure adequate protection was provided in all 
eventualities. The likely end result would be far more information would be 
withheld. 
Perhaps most importantly, it must be recognised that a 'class' or 'category' approach 
would be a incongruous concept to insert into the existing purpose-based scheme of 
the Act. The 'class' approach was considered and rejected by the Danks committee, 
and has become anathema to the Ombudsman, as has been noted many times. 169 In 
truth, it is highly unlikely that any such redraft could be made to 'work' either 
structurally in terms of the OIA, or politically. 
(ii) Legislative Simplification 
If a 'categorical' approach is not suitable, perhaps the overall 'purposive' approach 
of the provisions could be retained but simplified by combining them into one 
section. This was a possibility suggested in an early draft of the Law Commission 
report; the fact that there had been very limited separate use of section 9(2)(f)(iv) 
'd d h' 'd 170 was cons1 ere to support t 1s 1 ea. 
Again, the attraction of combining the provisions is that this would seem to provide 
an opportunity to simplify the tasks of both withholders and the investigating 
Ombudsman. The advantage of a 'combined' provision would be that the 
problematic distinctions such as between 'advice' and 'opinion' could be disposed 
of. A combined provision could also place an overall emphasis on the impact upon 
168 Law Commission " Review of the Official Information Act 1982" Report 40 Wellington ew 
Zealand 1997 paragraph 224. 
169 Most recently commented upon in connection with the DPMC investigation ; Report of the 
Ombudsmen/or the Year ended 30 June 2002 (AJHR, A.3, 2002), 30. 
170Law Commission "Official Information: Recommendations for legislative and Practical 
Development" (Draft /23 Wellington New Zealand 1993) paragraph 69. 
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the conduct of public affairs, doing away entirely with the requirement on both 
withholders and Ombudsmen to divine unspecified 'conventions' protecting the 
confidentiality of advice. It may be argued that such an approach would more 
accurately reflect the primary concerns of both withholders and the Ombudsman. 
Possibly the simplest approach to such a combined provision would be to collapse 
the provisions together, so that good reason for withholding official information 
would exist if the withholding was necessary to: 
"(fg) Maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through-
(i) The free and frank expression of opinions or the provision of advice 
by or between or to Ministers of the Crown or members of an 
organisation or officers and employees of any Department or 
. . . h f h . d " 171 organisation m t e course o t e1r uty; 
However, if greater ease of use and certainty of operation is the goal, a redraft of this 
kind may well fail. There seems little doubt that such an approach is liable to 
generate further uncertainty of application in at least the short term. This seems 
particularly likely in light of the most recent Guidelines offered by the Ombudsman 
on the existing provisions. As we have seen above, the 'executive' versus 'general 
government' distinction is acknowledged by officials, and seems supported in the 
context of the provisions wording and construction. 172 This distinction would 
presumably be lost or muddled by the reduction of the provisions to a single 
subsection of the kind suggested. 
It also seems clear that such a 'combined' withholding ground has at least the 
potential to increase (possibly greatly) the amount and type of information withheld 
171 [t is interesting to note that this formulation has a number of similarities with Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Australia) s 36 discussed above. 
m This distinction is also found in most 'class' based overseas freedom of information legislation. 
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under the OIA. As we have seen, the Ombudsman has put in considerable efforts in 
forging the distinctions between the provisions, and collapsing them together is 
liable to have unpredictable effects - in the example above, there is no requirement 
that advice be 'tendered' for example, and with no 'executive' context for section 
9(2)(f)(iv), the scope for withholding 'advice' may be greatly expanded. 173 
In effect, the cost of legislative simplification might well be increased scope for 
withholding infom1ation. It may be partly for this reason that in the draft paper the 
Law Commission ultimately did not recommend the unification of the provisions. 
(iii) Specific Protection for 'Active Consideration' 
Another option for amendment of the provisions was suggested recently by Matthew 
Palmer. 174 After noting the difficulties apparent with the inappropriate reliance on 
oral advice, Professor Palmer suggested that the Act could be amended in that 
" .. it should be made clearer in the Act that there may be good reason to withhold 
advice or exchanges of views between officials and Ministers ( and between 
Ministers themselves) if it relates to an issue currently under active consideration. 
This would have to be drafted carefully in order to avoid it being abused." 175 
This proposition might go some way towards addressing the difficult 'timing' issues 
with release that have been discussed. On the other hand, there must be a question 
as to how much effect such an amendment would have on the behaviour of officials 
173 Although the notion of 'free and frank advice' is not entirely new; this phrase was used in the 
course of the public interest immunity arguments in Environmental Defence Society Inc v South 
Pacific Aluminium Ltd (no 2) [ l 98 l] l ZLR l 53 (CA). 
174 Matthew S. R. Palmer, "Mi nisterial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: 
Conflict or Complement?" (Institute for International Research conference, Wellington, 4 April 
2001). 
175 Matthew S. R. Palmer, "Mi nisterial Responsibility versus Chief Executive Accountability: 
Conflict or Complement?" above, 15. It may also be noted that the (then) Secretary for Justice 
suggested that "at least in the initial phase of MM P, the protection of the deliberative phase of the 
policy process may require special care"; J Belgrave, "The Official Information Act and the Policy 
Process" in Legal Research Foundation, The Official Information Act Seminar Papers: General 
Overview of Official Information and the Official Information Act ( 1997) at 31. 
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or ministers. Many of the officials dealing with questions m this area seem to 
appreciate that the fact that the matter at hand is still 'under active consideration' is a 
major factor taken into account by the Ombudsman in determining whether section 
9(2)(f)(iv) has properly been invoked. This has also been made quite clear in the 
revised guidelines. 
A second difficulty is that the Ombudsman would be likely to oppose such an 
amendment as constituting a 'class' approach (albeit a limited one). Evidence for 
this can be found in the revised guidelines, which under the 'common 
misconceptions ' section contains an emphatic rejection of a general 'under 
consideration' class approach. 176 
B. Conclusions on Amendment 
While the Law Commission conceded that the provisions were 'less than perfect', 
ultimately in its final recommendations it saw no need for amendment.
177 This 
conclusion seems to reflect a recognition that the provisions seem to be 'working' in 
as much as they provide the Ombudsmen with tools allowing them to ensure that the 
bulk of official information falling into 'advice' or 'opinion' categories is released. 
On the other hand, where the release of information could provide a genuine hazard 
to the processes of government, they can provide effective grounds for withholding. 
The concern on the part of the Law Commission seems to have been that this is a 
very sensitive and finely balanced area, where any 'tinkering ' could cause more 
harm than good in that legislative changes "may well generate new contentions of no 
176 Ombudsmen 's Practice Guidelines (September 2002) Patt E, Chapter 6. 
177 Law Commission "Review of the Official Information Act 1982" Report 40 Wellington ew 
Zealand 1997 paragraphs E34 and 247. 
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real merit and of a legalistic type, giving rise to cost and delay both to agencies and 
to individual requesters of information." 178 
In discussions with officials, this too was a common view. Despite the difficulties 
that the provisions present officials with, very few of those spoken to believed that 
these difficulties could be addressed or substantially ameliorated by legislative 
amendment. 
Some officials were also quick to point out that the practical prospect of amendment 
in this area was remote. The Ombudsman was unlikely to support amendment in 
this area, and indeed has given every indication of being fully satisfied with the 
provisions as they stand. Any political interest seeking to press for amendment in 
this area would be liable to fall under suspicion of having ulterior motives in seeking 
to withhold more information than under the present construction. 
C. Administrative Approaches 
(i) Education and Guidelines 
In rejecting substantive legislative amendment as an appropriate option for the 
provisions, the Law Commission went on to conclude "[w]e consider the answer to 
problems with the provisions lies in a renewed effort to make them work through the 
issue of guidelines, case notes and other explanatory material." 179 
As we have already seen, there has been much work carried out by the Ombudsman 
in this regard, notably with the recent release of the revised Guidelines. However, it 
should be evident that while these Guidelines represent a significant step in 
furthering understanding of the Ombudsman 's approach to these provisions, they are 
178 Law Commission " Review of the Official Information Act I 982" Report 40 Wellington New 
Zealand 1997 paragraph 248. 
179 Law Commission " Review of the Official Information Act 1982" above, para 248 . 
60 
unlikely to provide a complete answer to the problems that arise. Similarly, while 
the case notes provide an important resource, for reasons discussed they fall short of 
being an ideal reference for those seeking a clear understanding of the provisions. 
A difficulty underlying the Law Commission's analysis is the fact that it did not 
have available to it data that would provide a strong evidential basis for assessing 
exactly how significant the problems arising in relation to the provisions were. 180 
This is a difficulty that the present paper also shares; the anecdotal evidence 
obtained can provide no more than an indication of the true scope of the issues. 
Accordingly, it may be concluded that a comprehensive solution to the problems 
arising would involve both a facility to measure and assess the importance of the 
compliance issues identified, to identify other problems that may not be immediately 
apparent, and to provide educative and analytical solutions to those problems. Such 
a 'package solution' may not be out ofreach. 
(ii) The Prospect ofan Information Unit 
For the first five years of operation of the OIA, the introduction of the Act was 
fostered by the New Zealand Information Authority ('the Authority'), a body that 
held both regulatory and monitoring roles in relation to a wide variety of freedom of 
information issues. 181 The Authority successfully undertook "a massive programme 
of work" but was discontinued in July 1988, with the oversight of the Act being 
transferred to an Information Unit within the Department of Justice. 182 The 
Information Unit was in tum disbanded in 1995. 
180 This is largely because, as has been noted, statistical evidence in this area is very hard to obtain. 
181 Danks Committee, Towards Open Government (Volume 2, Supplementary Report, Wellington , 
1980), para 3.03. 
182 See R Snell, "The Kiwi Paradox - A Comparison of Freedom of Information in Australia and 
New Zealand" Federal Law Review Vo! 28 o.3 2000, 57 5 - 616 at 60 I. 
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With the passing of the Information Authority, much of the role of education about 
the OIA has been taken on by the Ombudsman. There are however difficulties in the 
Ombudsmen adopting such a role; not only might the Ombudsman be expected to be 
far too busy to devote considerable time to pursuing general educative ends in 
relation to the Act, there is a clear tension in the Ombudsman having this role while 
being the main adjudicator on it. 183 
In the absence of a body dedicated to compliance, education and systematic review 
of issues relating to official information, the Law Commission argued that there was 
scope for the Ministry of Justice to take responsibility for these functions.
184 The 
Law Commission decided against the resunection of the Authority as a stand alone 
body, but recommended further review of this possibility. 185 
It may be that such a review is overdue. The Chief Ombudsman expressed the view 
to the author that in his opinion, the public sector should "take up responsibility for 
the advocacy or educative role." 186 In terms of how that might be done, Sir Brian 
noted: 
" . .I think the responsibility should be with the State Services Commission and that it 
should have a unit that is designed to foster the understanding of the Official 
Information Act for the whole of the public sector. It seems to fit comfortably 
within the concept of the State Services Commission. The Commission has access 
to the public service and a small unit could achieve what is required to ensure that 
183 See Law Commission "Review of the Official Information Act 1982" Report 40 Wellington ew 
Zealand 1997 para 45 ' 
184 See Law Commission "Review of the Official Information Act 1982" above, para 48. 
185 See Law Commission " Review of the Official Information Act 1982" above, para 49. 
186 The suggestion that the State Services Commission could take a leading role in education of 
agencies has been raised previously by the Ombudsmen ; Report of the Ombudsmen for the Year 
ended 30 Jun e 2002 (AJHR, A. 3, 2002), 21. 
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the public service is aware of its responsibilities and aware of how the Act operates 
in practice." 187 
This type of solution was also raised with the author by an official during an 
interview, although it was suggested that a unit could have a significant advisory 
role, as well as an educative function. It would seem that the creation of such a Unit 
would be supported by officials working within this (and other) areas of the OIA, 
not least because such a unit might be expected to ' free and frank ' or ' blunt' advice 
on the use of the provisions that the Ombudsman might be hindered from giving due 
to their adjudicative function. 
It is suggested that in order to address the range of issues identified in the present 
paper, the role of such a unit could be expanded even further to encompass 
monitoring and audit functions. Being incorporated into the State Services 
Commission (and thus centrally located in the public sector) such a unit might be 
expected to quickly gather the information and expertise necessary to provide useful 
assistance to officials in the areas they find most difficult, 188 and could also identify 
existing and developing compliance issues. The unit would also be in a position to 
promote the purpose-based ideals of the OIA, and to dissuade officials from simply 
seeking reasons to withhold a particular item of information. It might also be 
expected that such a unit may also be able to play an important role in ensuring 
greater consistency of approach, and accordingly better levels of compliance, 
throughout the public sector. 
Perhaps most importantly, such a Unit could be placed in an advantageous position 
to accumulate data on the use of the provisions and other aspects of the Act in order 
187 Interview with Sir Brian Elwood, Chief Ombudsman, (the author, Wellington , 6 September 
2002). 
188 Jn the present context perhaps assistance could be given in identifi cation of the conventions at 
issue in section 9(2)(f)(iv), or to provide education on the importance of re liance upon the correct 
prov1s10n . 
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to assist with monitoring and audit functions. A renewed Information Unit would 
be able to act as a centralised repository for information from throughout the public 
sector on requests received, responses and the outcomes of reviews (if undertaken). 
This information could provide the basis for robust compliance analysis of the kind 
being effectively conducted in Canada. 189 Even 'difficult' compliance areas such as 
the level of oral advice might be able to be explored by use of surveys and other 
methods If found to be significant issues (as indicated by anecdotal evidence), then 
appropriate educative programs could be undertaken in order to address the 
problem. 190 
VII CONCLUSION 
The superficially simple construction of the provisions conceals the extremely wide-
ranging considerations that must be taken into account to apply them correctly. It 
may be seen that their open-textured and adaptable form is both a great strength and 
a weakness. 
It is a strength, because they can be applied so as to ensure only that information 
necessary to protect the sensitive processes of government is withheld, and they 
have continued to be useful and applicable even where there has been significant 
changes in those processes themselves, such as with the introduction of MMP and 
coalition government. 
189 Although in part these approaches are responses to more serious problems such as significant 
occurrences of deliberate or malicious non-compliance; see Alasdair Roberts " Limited Access: 
Assessing the Health of Canada's Freedom of Information Laws" (April, 1998) School of Policy 
Studies, Queens University at I O -13 . 
19° Calls have recently been made for a similar (though independent) monitoring and auditing body 
as that proposed to be adopted in Australia; see Rick Snell "Administrative compliance - evaluating 
the effectiveness of freedom of information" (200 I) 93 Freedom of Information Review 26 at 30. 
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It is a weakness, because those required to employ them are faced with what are 
complicated and difficult to discern analyses, in a context where such analysis may 
be required to be conducted on a page by page (or sentence by sentence) basis, for a 
request that may comprise thousands of pages of material. 
There is some evidence that practical difficulties are arising for officials which may 
in turn be significantly effecting compliance with the OIA in this area, and that 
mistakes are likely to occur in both the inappropriate withholding of material, as 
well as perhaps the release of material that is contrary to the conventions and 
interests that are intended to be protected. The true scope of the problem is hard to 
ascertain, as hard data on such compliance issues (particularly the latter) is scarce. 
The proper solution does not appear to be a legislative one; certainly the adoption of 
overseas 'categorical' precedents would import their own significant problems and 
overall would be likely to represent a step backwards for freedom of information in 
this counh-y. Similarly, attempting to improve the application of the provisions by 
making small changes are liable to have unpredictable or even adverse effects, given 
the considerable weight of administrative decision making that presently support the 
prov1s1ons. 
Accordingly, the issues seem to be best addressed administratively. There has been 
significant recent work in this area with the release of the revised guidelines. 
However, while helpful, this is unlikely to provide a complete or even substantial 
solution to the problems noted. The history of the OIA itself shows that to be 
successful, changes in the area of freedom of information need to be supported by 
officials, as well as by the Ombudsmen and the public generally. Great progress 
could be made in improving compliance in this area by a dedicated public sector 
official information unit. Such a unit would be in a position to foster consistency of 
approach throughout the public sector, undertake more detailed analysis and 
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education, and gather further information about the compliance issues arising with 
these and other withholding provisions contained in the Act. 
Even with the introduction of such a unit, it may be expected that the provisions will 
still require tough questions to be answered. However, the work of such a unit 
would serve to ensure that those questions had the best chance of being answered 
correctly. 
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APPENDIX - NOTES ON INTERVIEWS 
The author is indebted to those who gave up their valuable time in order to discuss 
the issues arising in this paper. 
Those spoken to worked at or very close the core of government. They included a 
Chief Legal Advisor and Privacy Officer in core government departments, as well as 
an Advisor from Crown Law. While there has been some emphasis in this paper on 
compliance issues, the integrity and professionalism of the interviewees in relation 
to their obligations under the OIA was beyond doubt. 
The author would also specifically like to thank the Chief Ombudsman, Sir Brian 
Elwood for providing the benefit of his wealth of experience in this area. 
All interviews were conducted between 14 August and 6 September 2002, m 
Wellington. 
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